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1 Introduction
Thepurpose of this article is to describe aminimal logic of knowledgewhich can
be used by epistemologists with different philosophical orientations. A first way
to proceed is describing a modal logic based on a Kripke-semantics, specifying
how the accessibility relation should be restricted in order to represent knowl-
edge. However, it is not difficult to prove that this standard formal epistemolog-
ical analysis implies the validity of the principle of epistemic closure, namely of
the fact that, if oneboth knows that p and that if p thenq , thenhe/she also knows
that q . This principle, however, has been object of criticism and objections by
some epistemologists. Therefore, if we are looking for a general modal logical
framework that canbeusedbyphilosopherswithdifferent orientations, wehave
to construct a formal systemwhere the closure principle does not hold. An inter-
esting way to proceed is working with the semantics which has been developed
by logicians to account for the paradox of the logical omniscience. In fact, if we
introduce the “impossible worlds” and we construct a Rantala-semantics based
on them, we obtain a weaker logic where the closure principle does not hold.
In the first part of this article I present the modal logic T, which is generally
considered theminimal formal system for the logic of knowledge. Firstly I intro-
duce the syntax and the semantics of modal logic, secondly I characterize how
the accessibility relation Ra has to be restricted in order to obtain the logic T.
In the second part I prove that the principle of epistemic closure follows from
T and I try to underline some critical aspects of it. In the third part I introduce
an alternative logic for knowledge where the closure principle does not hold,
namely a modal logic with impossible worlds and a Rantala-semantics. Finally,
in the fourth part, I evaluate this proposal, trying to underline both upsides and
downsides of it.
2 The standard logic of knowledge
A first way to give a formal account to epistemological concepts such as belief
and knowledge is to adopt the language of modal logic. Even if the modal oper-
ators ^ and  are usually read as possibility and necessity, we can also adopt an
epistemic interpretation of them. On this alternative reading we will translate a
logical formula like p not as “it is necessary that p” but rather as “it is known
that p”, “it is believed that p” or “it is certain that p”. Following each of these
interpretations we can formulate a different modal logic, in order to formalize
the specific features of the considered epistemic operator. In what follows I will
be interested exclusively in the former of these alternatives and I will focus my
attention on the logic of knowledge.
Working with an epistemological interpretation of modal logic, it is worth
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specifying who is the subject of the knowledgewe are speaking about. If we read
p simply as “it is known that p”, themeaning of this operator remains not clear
enough. What does it mean, in fact, that something is known? Does it mean
that someone knows it? Or does it mean that everyone knows it? Therefore, in
order to be as clear as possible, we should adopt a more intuitive terminology
and make explicit the fact that we are working with a propositional notion of
knowledge andwithin a logic of individual agents. The box operator will be sub-
stituted by a K (for “knowledge”), followed by a letter that indicates who is the
agent that knows the considered proposition. Modal formulas will look, thus,
like Kap and Kbp and they will be read as “the agent a knows that p” and “the
agent b knows that p”. In what follows, we will be interested in formal systems
with only one agent, but it is important to keep in mind that we can introduce
many K -operators, in order to map the knowledge of more than one subject1.
Let us now move, after these introductory remarks, to give a precise defini-
tion of the syntax of the propositional modal logic for knowledge. We proceed
extending the alphabet of classical propositional logic with a knowledge opera-
tor Ka .
Definition 2.1 (Alphabet of Propositional Modal Logic for Knowledge). An al-
phabet for propositional modal logic for knowledge is defined as the union of
the following disjointed sets:
• A denumerable set of atomic propositional variables P = {p0, p1, ...}.
• The set of the logical connectives C = {¬, ∧,→}.
• The set of the knowledge operator O = {Ka }.
• The set of auxiliary symbols A = {(, )}.
Given the alphabet, it is possible to define inductively the set of the formulas of
the logic of knowledge.
Definition 2.2 (Formulas of Propositional Modal Logic of Knowledge). The for-
mulas of the modal logic of knowledge are given by the following definition by
induction:
1. If ϕ is an atomic propositional variable, then ϕ is a formula.
2. If ϕ is a formula, then also its negation ¬ϕ is a formula.
3. If ϕ and χ are formulas, then also their conjunction (ϕ ∧ χ) is a formula.
4. If ϕ and χ are formulas, then also the conditional (ϕ→ χ) is a formula.
1For the introduction ofmultiple agents see both ´ family=Hendricks, familyi=H., given=Vincent,
giveni=V., ´ family=Symons, familyi=S., given=John, giveni=J., (2015, pp. 9-11) and ´ family=Holliday,
familyi=H., given=Wesley H., giveni=W. H., (forthcoming, pp. 5-7).
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5. If ϕ is a formula, then also Kaϕ is a formula.
6. Nothing else is a formula.
The semantics of the logic of knowledge is provided by a Kripke-structure,
which is the standard way to interpret modal languages.
Definition 2.3 (Kripke-structures). Given a propositional modal logic of knowl-
edge, a Kripke-structureM is a triple 〈W, Ra, V 〉, where:
1. W is anon-empty set. Intuitively,W is a set of “possibleworlds” or “possible
scenarios”.
2. Ra is a binary relation overW , i.e. a subset ofW ×W . Intuitively, we read
vRaw as “the possibleworldw is epistemically accessible from the possible
world v by the agent a”.
3. V is a function that assigns to every atomic propositional formula a subset
ofW . Intuitively,V specifies in which possible worlds each atomic formula
is true.
Given the Kripke-structures, we can define the notion of truth in a world:
Definition 2.4 (Truth in a world). Given a propositional modal logic for knowl-
edge, a Kripke-structureM and a worldw , the notionM w ϕ of being true in a
world is defined as follows:
1. when ϕ is atomic, thenM w ϕ iffw ∈ V (ϕ);
2. when ϕ has the form ¬χ, thenM w ϕ iffM 2w χ;
3. when ϕ has the form (χ ∧ ψ), thenM w ϕ iffM w χ andM w ψ;
4. when ϕ has the form (χ → ψ), thenM w ϕ iffM 2w χ orM w ψ;
5. when ϕ has the form Ka χ, thenM w ϕ iff for every possible world v such
thatwRav ,M v χ.
The definition of truth in a world allows us to define two further important no-
tions. We say that a formula ϕ is true in a model M if and only if it is true in
every worldw ∈W of the Kripke-structureM. We say that a formula ϕ is a valid
formula if and only if it is true in every world w ∈ W of every Kripke-structure
M.
What we have described so far is the minimal system K of modal logic, with
theonlypeculiarity that the informal reading thatwehaveassumed for themodal
operator is “the agent a knows that...”. Nevertheless, it is clear that to obtain
a logic of knowledge this is not enough. What one needs, rather, is to specify
the formal properties that are typical of knowledge and to represent them in the
logic. Putting specific restrictions over the accessibility relation Ra , it is possible
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to obtain many modal logics stronger than K, where more principles are valid
formula. The problem is that it is not sufficiently clear which modal system
photographs in the correct way the formal properties of knowledge. Since the
purpose of this article is to examine which logic can be accepted by epistemolo-
gists with different philosophical orientations, we will extend K only with those
principles which are generally taken for granted in the epistemological debate.
Therefore, the only restriction that we want impose to our logical system is that
it has to satisfy the following principle:
(T) Kaϕ→ ϕ
What (T) says is that, if one knows aproposition, then this very sameproposition
must be true. This does not only follow from any analysis of knowledge as true
belief plus something, but it also seems to be a valid minimal description of the
meaning of knowledge. Indeed, if one says that he/she knows that p but it is not
the case that p, it seems reasonable to conclude that he/she does not know that
p, but rather only believes that p2.
If we want that the principle (T) holds in the logical framework that we are
considering, we have to put a restriction on the accessibility relation Ra . More
precisely, as we prove with the following theorem, we have to restrict our atten-
tion to those Kripke-structures where the accessibility relation is reflexive. The
modal logic that we obtain when we work only with reflexive accessibility rela-
tions is called T.
Theorem 2.1. Given the language of propositional modal logic and its Kripke-
structureM = 〈W, Ra, V 〉, the formula (T) Kaϕ → ϕ is a valid formula if and only
if the accessibility relation Ra is reflexive.
Proof: Assuming that the accessibility relations Ra inM is reflexive, then given
any possible worldw ∈W we have thatwRaw . Therefore, sinceM w Kaϕ holds,
thenM v ϕ holds in every world v such that v is accessible from w . But for
reflexivity we have that w is accessible from itself and, therefore, thatM w ϕ.
Vice versa, assuming that Kaϕ → ϕ is a valid formula then, for every Kripke-
structureM and every world w in itM w Kaϕ → ϕ. Given the semantics of
the conditional, this amounts to say that it is not the case thatM w Kaϕ and
M 2w ϕ. But, if Ra was not reflexive, we could construct a Kripke-structure such
as N = 〈W, Ra, V 〉, withW = {v, w } and Ra = {〈w, v 〉}. In N we have that, if
v ∈ V (ϕ) butw < V (ϕ), thenN w Kaϕ butN 2w ϕ, contradicting our claim that
Kaϕ→ ϕ is a valid formula. Therefore, Ra must be reflexive. 
2This aspect is famously stressed by ´ family=Wittgenstein, familyi=W., given=Ludwig, giveni=L.,
(1969).
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3 Theprincipleofepistemicclosureand itsproblems
In the previous part of this article I have introduced themodal logicT, in order to
represent someminimal formal properties of knowledge. Moving a step further,
it is now possible to prove an interesting result, which says that the principle of
epistemic closure is a valid formula in T. Firstly, let us clarify what wemeanwith
the name of “principle of epistemic closure”.
(CP) If an agent knows that ϕ and he/she knows that if ϕ then χ, then he/she
also knows that χ.
It is straightforward to translate this thesis into the languageof the logicof knowl-
edge. We thus obtain the following formal version of the closure principle:
(FCP) (Kaϕ ∧ Ka (ϕ→ χ))→ Ka χ
We can now prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1. Given the logic of knowledge T, the formal closure principle (FCP)
is a valid formula.
Proof: We reason for absurd. If (FCP) was not a valid formula, there would be a
worldw of a Kripke-structureM = 〈W, Ra, V 〉, where (FCP) does not hold. Given
the semantics of the conditional, this means thatM w Kaϕ ∧ Ka (ϕ → χ) but
M 2w Ka χ. GivenM w Kaϕ, we have that in every world accessible from w ,
ϕ holds. GivenM w Ka (ϕ → χ), we have that in every world accessible from
w , ϕ → χ holds. Moreover, sinceM 2w Ka χ, there is at least one world v such
that wRav whereM 2v χ. But in this same world v we have thatM v ϕ and
M v ϕ → χ hold too, from which it follows thatM v χ. Therefore, we obtain
the contradiction thatM v χ andM 2v χ. 
If our concerns are mainly epistemological this result has a particular rele-
vance. In fact, what we have proved is that even if we work with a weak modal
system, the principle of epistemic closure will hold in it3. Therefore, if we have
some reason to refuse the principle of epistemic closure, then we can not adopt
the formal logic T anymore, for it describes knowledge in a way which is incon-
sistent with our theory. In particular Dretske (1970) offers at least two possible
reasons to refuse the closure principle4. In the rest of this part I will present both
3Notice, moreover, that in the proof of the theorem 3.1. we did not make any use of the fact that
the accessibility relation between worlds is reflexive. Therefore, our proof is valid also for the basic
modal logic K.
4´ family=Luper, familyi=L., given=Steven, giveni=S., (2016) synthesizes a wide range of argu-
ments against the closure principle, often originally raised by Dretske and Nozick. However, even
if Luper’s reconstruction is clear, I do not agree with his presentation of the arguments from the
“analysis of knowledge”. In fact, the theories of knowledge supported by Dretske and Nozick are ex-
planations of why the closure principle fails and not reasons to refuse it. Luper commits, therefore,
a sort of inversion of the right order of explanation.
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of them, but I will not try to set the question about their validity. Indeed, I only
want to show that it might be reasonable for an epistemologist to reject the clo-
sure principle. In fact, given the possibility that (FCP) is not acceptable, we have
to look for amodal logic for knowledge weaker than the standard one described
by theKripke-structures. Ourpurpose, in fact, is not to takepart in the epistemo-
logical debate and to identify themodal logic which better describes knowledge
but, rather, it is to find a minimal logical framework which can be accepted by
epistemologists of different currents.
A first critique to the principle of epistemic closure is linked to skepticism.
In fact, one general way to reconstruct the argument presented by the skeptic is
with the following argument:
(1) I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat
(2) If I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat, then I do not know that I
have hands.
(3) I do not know that I have hands ∴
The premiss (2) of this argument is a consequence of an instance of (CP). If I
know that I have hands and I know that if I have hands I am not a brain in a vat,
then I know that I am not a brain in a vat. Therefore, if I do not know that I am
not a brain in a vat, then either I do not know that I have hands, or I do not know
that if I have hands I am not a brain in a vat. However, since I know that if I have
hands I am not a brain in a vat, we can exclude the second disjunct and obtain
(2): if I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat, then I do not know that I have
hands5.
If skepticism is expressed in the form of the syllogism presented above, there
are two main strategies to criticize it. Either one denies the premiss (1), either
one denies the premiss (2), namely the closure principle. The first hornwas cho-
senbyMoore (1939), who reversed the skeptic’s argument in its contraposed ver-
sion6.
5It is worth underlining that, in order to obtain (2) from (CP), we have to take for granted that we
know that if we have handswe are not a brain in a vat. Although thismight seem trivial, there are two
problematic aspects which deserve some further reflections. On the one hand, one may think that
it is much more reasonable to deny the premiss of the argument from (CP) to (2), namely to assert
that we do not know that if we have hands then we are not a brain in a vat, rather than to accept the
conclusion it leads to, i.e. that we do not know that we have hands. On the other hand, there might
be a skeptical scenario that we do not know, or a person who never thought about brains in a vat.
But if one has never thought about a skeptical scenario, it does not seemplausible to say that he/she
knows that if he/she has hands, then he/she is not in the considered skeptical scenario.
6For historical’s sake, let me remark that Moore did not deal with the brain in a vat hypothesis in
his original article of 1939, but he rather considered more traditional skeptical scenarios.
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(1) I do know that I have hands
(2) If I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat, then I do not know that I
have hands.
(3) I do know that I am not a brain a vat ∴
However, this solution implies that we do actually know that we are not brains
in a vat, which is a conclusion that many might find excessively strong. There-
fore, if we want to remain faithful both to the intuition that we do know that we
have hands, both to the intuition that we do not know that we are not brains in
a vat, we have to abandon the closure principle. Notice that this is not an argu-
ment against skepticism. If we want to criticize skepticism because the closure
principle does not hold we need independent arguments against (CP). On the
contrary, this is an argument against the closure principle, because skepticism
does not hold. So, what this argument needs are independent reasons to refuse
skepticism.
However, Dretske criticizes the principle of epistemic closure also in a sec-
ond more explicit way, bringing some counterexamples to it. Perhaps the most
famous one is the so-called “zebra case”. Imagine that you are in a zoowith your
nephew. While you are walking around, he asks you if you know what is the an-
imal you are looking at. You observe it, you notice that it looks exactly how you
expect a zebra should look like, and you also find a sign with “zebra” written on
it. Without any further doubt you would reply to your nephew’s question some-
thing like: “Sure! It is a zebra”. Thus, you do know that the animal you are ob-
serving is a zebra. But do you know that it is not a disguised mule? Indeed, it
might be a mule so well depicted by the zoo-officers to look exactly like a zebra,
maybe in order to attract more visitors.
Examples like this present a sort of strange situation. On the one hand, we
haveaplentyof reasons tobelieve that the animalweareobserving is a zebra. On
the other hand, we do not know that it is not a disguisedmule. Moreover, we are
also completely aware that mules and zebras are different animals. Therefore:
(i) we know that the animal we are looking at is a zebra;
(ii) we know that if the animal we are looking at is a zebra, then it is not a dis-
guised mule;
(iii) we do not know that the animal we are looking at is not a disguised mule.
Clearly, (i), (ii) and (iii) taken together are an instance of failure of the closure
principle.
Together, these two arguments show that the principle of epistemic closure
is not so obvious and trivial as one might believe at first sight. A closer exami-
nation of it shows both that it has skeptical consequences and that it does not
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always fit our intuitions in concrete examples. Therefore, if we want to find a
propositional modal logic which describes some minimal properties of knowl-
edge generally accepted by epistemologists we have to weaken in some way the
logic of knowledge that we have previously presented.
4 The impossible worlds and the Rantala-semantics
In the context of the logical literature, an alternative to the standard Kripke-
semantics has been provided in order to account for the problem of logical om-
niscience. In fact, one further consequence of adopting a modal logic like K or
stronger is that any agent knows every classical tautology. In fact, since classical
tautologies are valid in every possible world, the agent always knows them, for
theyare trivially true inall theworldswhich theagenthas access to. Although it is
important to keep distinct the problem of the epistemological closure principle
from the one of the logical omniscience, we can try to apply the logical system
used to answer to the latter of theseproblems also to respond to the former one7.
Given the syntax of modal logic that we have already defined, we can intro-
duce a slightly different semantics, namely a Rantala–semantics8.
Definition4.1 (Rantala-structures). Givenapropositionalmodal logic of knowl-
edge, a Rantala-structure R is a quadruple 〈W,W ′, Ra, V 〉, where:
1. W is anon-empty set. Intuitively,W is a set of “possibleworlds” or “possible
scenarios”.
2. W ′ is a set. Intuitively,W ′ is a set of “impossible worlds” or “impossible
scenarios”.
3. Ra is a binary relation overW ∪W ′, i.e. a subset of (W ∪W ′) × (W ∪W ′).
Intuitively, we read vRaw as “the possible or impossible world w is epis-
temically accessible from the possible or impossible world v by the agent
a”.
4. V is a function that assigns to every atomic propositional formula a subset
ofW ∪W ′ and to every formula a subset ofW ′. Intuitively, V specifies in
which possible or impossible worlds each atomic formula is true, and in
which impossible worlds each formula is true.
Asonecan immediatelynotice, thedifferencebetween theKripkeand theRantala
structures relies on the introduction of a set of impossible worlds. To see how
7On the difference between the problem of logical omniscience and the one of epistemic closure
see ´ family=Holliday, familyi=H., given=Wesley H., giveni=W. H., (forthcoming, pp. 8-10).
8The name of Rantala-semantics comes from the Finnish logician Veikko Rantala. Here I follow
the presentation of its semantics given by ´ family=Wansing, familyi=W., given=Heinrich, giveni=H.,
(1990), who also provides an interesting comparison between the Rantala-semantics and other
methods to solve the paradox of logical omniscience.
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they affect the interpretation of every formula, we shall reformulate also the no-
tion of truth in a model.
Definition 4.2 (Truth in a world). Given a propositional modal logic for knowl-
edge, a Rantala-Structure R and a worldw , the notion R w ϕ of being true in a
world is defined as follows:
1. Ifw ∈W ′, namely ifw is an impossible world, then R w ϕ iffw ∈ V (ϕ);
2. Ifw ∈W , namely ifw is a possible world, then:
(a) when ϕ is atomic, then R w ϕ iffw ∈ V (ϕ);
(b) when ϕ has the form ¬χ, then R w ϕ iff R 2w χ;
(c) when ϕ has the form (χ ∧ ψ), then R w ϕ iff R w χ and R w ψ;
(d) when ϕ has the form (χ → ψ), then R w ϕ iff R 2w χ or R w ψ;
(e) when ϕ has the form Ka χ, then R w ϕ iff for every possible or impos-
sible world v such thatwRav , R v χ.
It is now possible to clarify which is the role that the impossible worlds play in
the new structure now defined. A first notable aspect is that, while in regards
of the possible worlds the notion of truth in a world is defined inductively, the
truth-value of every formula in an impossible world is directly specified by the
assignmentV . In an impossible world we might have that a disjunction is true
even if its two disjuncts are both false, or that even if two formulas are true their
conjunction is false, and so on. The distinguished aspect of this structure is that
the anomalous behaviour of impossible worlds has some consequences on the
evaluation of formulas in “normal” possible worlds. In fact, in order for amodal
formula like Kap to be true in a possible worldw , the formula p has to be true in
every world v , both possible and impossible, such thatwRav .
Thenotionof valid formulahasnowtobedefined for thenewRantala-semantics:
we say that a formula ϕ is a valid formula if and only if it is true in every possible
world of every Rantala-structure. Given this new definition and thanks to the
introduction of the impossible worlds, we can show that the principle of epis-
temic closure (FCP) is not a valid formula anymore. In fact, even if R w Kaϕ
and R w Ka (ϕ → χ), it is still possible that R 2w Ka χ, since there might be an
impossible world i such thatwRa i where i ∈ V (ϕ) and i ∈ V (ϕ→ χ) but i < V (χ).
Moreover, notice that the introduction of impossible worlds does not im-
ply that “everything goes”. We can, as we have already done for K, propose a
strengthening of this logical framework in order to meet at least the essential
properties of the knowledge operator. Exactly as we have argued in the first part
of this article, theminimal requirement for a logic of knowledge seems to be that
if we know a proposition, then this very proposition is true. Again, if we impose
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that the accessibility relation is reflexive, then we obtain a logic where the for-
mula (T) Kaϕ→ ϕ is a valid formula. In this way we can define the new logic T’,
obtained by considering only those Rantala-structures where the accessibility
relation between worlds is reflexive.
5 An evaluation of the Rantala-semantics strategy
In this last part I shall draw some consequences from the previous analysis and
try to evaluate if the Rantala-semantics thatwe have defined provides aminimal
logical framework todescribe the formal properties of knowledge. Firstly, I argue
that it is possible to identify two reasons to believe that the Rantala-semantics
actually describes a valid minimal logic of knowledge. Then I will consider two
objections. While one will result to be only an apparent critique to the Rantala-
semantics strategy, the second one will identify a true limit of it.
(i) A first observation is that the logic T’ that we have defined actually pro-
vides the minimal logical framework for knowledge which we were looking for.
On the one hand, the principle (T) Kaϕ→ ϕ results to be a valid formula in this
system: working in T’we can represent the fact that if an agent knows a proposi-
tion, then that proposition is true. On the other hand, the logic T’ does not force
us to accept the closure principle, since (FCP) is not a valid formula in it. There-
fore, epistemologists with different theories about knowledge can all accept the
modal system T’ as a minimal framework, which reflects only those properties
of knowledge which are unanimously recognized.
(ii)Moreover, theRantala-semantics is sufficientlyflexible toprovidenotonly
a minimal common framework, but also a basis suitable for further develop-
ments. Given the minimal logic T’, it is possible to obtain systems with new ax-
ioms or inference rules imposing new conditions on the accessibility relation
Ra or on the evaluation functionV 9. In this way, the Rantala-semantics can be
used also to representmore complex theories of knowledge, inwhichmore prin-
ciples hold and should be treated as valid formulas. Epistemologists of differ-
ent philosophical orientations will thus share the common framework given by
T’, and they will also be able to describe more complex and rich systems with-
out the need of describing a new and different semantics. Even if T’ is a quite
general and minimal system, we can start from it and obtain step by step new
and stronger logics, which will formalize richer and more complex accounts of
knowledge.
(iii) However, one aspect of the Rantala-semantics that some philosophers
may find problematic is the fact that it makes use of impossible worlds. In fact,
even if we accept to work with the framework of possible worlds of the Kripke-
9Compare with ´ family=Wansing, familyi=W., given=Heinrich, giveni=H., (1990), who also
presents some examples of restriction.
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structures, the introduction of impossible worlds poses some new problems.
Indeed, although possible worlds represent sets and combinations of facts and
events that are not actual, they are still consistent with the laws of classical logic.
Differently, it is not straightforward toaccount forworldswhere themost evident
logical contradictions may hold. In an impossible world both a proposition and
its negation might be true, two disjuncts can be true and the entire disjunction
false, and so on. Nevertheless, even if impossibleworlds surely present paradox-
ical features, I think that this problem is only apparent.
Firstly, as Nolan (2013, p. 367–370) underlines, almost every metaphysical
theory about the possible worlds can be extended in order to account also for
the impossibleones. Theonly theorywhichhas someproblemswhile explaining
the nature of impossible worlds ismodal realism, which regards possible worlds
as entities really existing. However, there are also some attempts to extend the
modal realist perspective in order to describe impossible worlds10. Moreover,
onemay also decide to follow an alternative direction and to consider the useful
theoretical role of the impossible worlds a valid reason to reject modal realism
and to defend another metaphysical perspective also in regards of the “normal”
possible worlds.
Furthermore, it is notobviousat all that the introductionof impossibleworlds
in epistemic logic forces us to take an explicit position about their metaphysical
nature11. In fact, the specific philosophical problems that a modal logic raises
are linked to the informal interpretation that we decide to give of its operators.
For instance, if we read the box symbol as representing necessity, then we have
to clarify what does it mean that a proposition is necessary in a world w if and
only if it is true in every possible world which is accessible from w . An anal-
ysis of the nature of possible world is essential, in this case, in order to make
sense of the metaphysical interpretation of the system of modal logic that we
are considering. However, if the reading thatwe are adopting is epistemic, we do
not need to take such a metaphysical attitude. As we have already said defining
the Kripke-structures, the label of possibleworld can be substitutedwithout any
problemwith the one of “scenario”. Indeed, the possible and impossible worlds
are only the combinations of facts and events that an agent may find plausible
descriptions of the reality or not. The informal epistemological reading of the
knowledge operator does not call for any metaphysical interpretation. The fact
that an agent knows a proposition if and only if that proposition is true in every
world to which he/she has access only means that that proposition is part of all
the descriptions that he/she considers as possibly valid representations of the
reality.
10Compare with ´ family=Nolan, familyi=N., given=Daniel P., giveni=D. P., (2013, p. 369).
11´ family=Wansing, familyi=W., given=Heinrich, giveni=H., (1990, p. 536) takes an even stronger
position, saying that the question itself about the nature of the impossibleworlds is “unsatisfactory”.
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(iv) Ultimately, despite its many virtues, I think that it is possible to identify
a proper limit of the Rantala-semantics strategy. Let us distinguish two differ-
ent aspects: the failure of the closure principle itself and the explanation of the
fact that it does not hold. Depending on what we ask to an epistemic logic, we
might then give different evaluations to the Rantala-semantics strategy. On the
one hand, as I have already pointed out, the modal logic T’ offers a formal sys-
temwhere the closure principle of knowledge is not a valid formula. If we adopt
T’, indeed, we are able to representmany formal properties of knowledge and to
potentially adjust the system–working on the accessibility relation and the eval-
uation function – to meet the characteristics of different epistemological theo-
ries. On the other hand, the Rantala-semantics does not provide an explanation
of why the closure principle fails. Or, even worse, one may argue that it actu-
ally gives a wrong explanation of this fact. Indeed, the “cause” that determines
the failure of (FCP) in the Rantala-semantics is the introduction of the impos-
sible worlds. If we try to interpret this formal aspect from an epistemological
perspective, the result is that the epistemic closure principle does not hold be-
cause the agent consider as plausible descriptions of the reality also scenarios
where the laws of logic do not hold. However, the problem is that this is not
the explanation that the epistemologists who refuse closure – notably Dretske
and Nozick – have provided. Therefore, even if it offers a framework that can be
accepted also by the epistemologists who do not accept the closure principle,
the Rantala-semantics do not reflect in any way their intuitions about why this
principle does not hold12.
Finally, trying to sum up the considerations developed in this last part, it is
possible to sketch an evaluation of the Rantala–semantics strategy. The result
that we obtained can be regarded as twofold and it depends on what we ask to
an epistemic logic. If we want a strong characterisation of a formal system, such
that it reflects all the theoretical features of an epistemological theory, then the
Rantala–semantics strategy does not seem to be the right way to account for the
problems presented by the closure principle. Still, a more modest attitude is
also possible. In fact, we can demand to a formal system only to verify as valid
those principles – and only those – which an epistemological theory regards as
the formal properties of knowledge. In this light, even if it does not provide any
heuristic insight about the failure of (FCP), the Rantala-semantics is an interest-
ing common framework for different epistemological perspectives, which can
also be refined and strengthened in further ways.
12An interesting contribution on this topic is ´ family=Holliday, familyi=H., given=Wesley H.,
giveni=W. H., (2015), who directly formalizes the epistemological theories proposed by Dretske and
Nozick. Notice, however, that although in this way a formal system gains in heuristic power, it also
loses the generality that makes it acceptable by epistemologists with different ideas.
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